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 Abstract 
 
The relationships which characterise the outcomes of the interactions between firms in 
the economy appear to follow power law behaviour. In particular, there is evidence that 
the empirical power laws which relate the size of an extinction to its frequency are 
similar for both biological species and firms in the economy. 
 
Biological species interact with each other in ways which either increase or decrease the 
fitness levels of individual species.  In the same way, firms in the economy carry out 
strategies, and the net outcome of the interactions between firms is to increase or 
decrease the fitness of other firms..  
 
Models which are used to describe the interactions of  biological species can be given 
straightforward interpretations in terms of the interactions of firms in an industry.  The 
general versions of models of interactions between agents allow for co-operative 
behaviour between pairs of agents.  We contrast the properties of such a model with 
special cases of it, in which interactions are restricted so that only competitive 
interactions between pairs of agents are permitted.  Such pure economic competition 
(PEC) behaviour is regarded as desirable by economic theory,  
 
The properties of the two models are strikingly different.  A power law no longer provides 
a good description of the relationship between the size and frequency of extinctions in the 
PEC model, in which there are substantial numbers of very large extinctions.  As a result, 
the level of fitness of the system as a whole remains considerably lower than in the 
general version of the model.  This suggests that models of pure economic competition do 
not provide a good description of how many industries actually behave, and that a 
certain amount of collaboration and co-operation between firms is required for the 
survival of an industry. 
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  1. Introduction 
 
The relationships which characterise the outcomes of the interactions between firms in 
the economy appear to follow power law behaviour.  Economic recessions occur when, 
as a result of the output decisions of individual firms, total output growth falls below 
zero.  A power law with exponent -1.7 gives a reasonable description of the duration of 
recessions in 17 Western economies over the period 1871-1994 [1].  An analysis of the 
extinction rates of the world's 100 largest industrial companies in 1912 over the period 
from 1912 to 1995 shows that a power law with estimated exponent of close to -2 gives a 
good empirical description of the data [2].   
 
The size distribution of extinction events amongst biological species can also be 
described by a power law with an exponent of around -2 [3-5]. A number of models 
based upon the principle of self-organised criticality of a system arising from interactions 
between agents have been developed to account for this empirical power law relationship 
(for example, [6 - 9], with a recent survey given by [10] )1. 
 
The models which are used to describe the interactions of biological species can be 
interpreted in terms of the interactions of firms in an economy.   
 
An important implication of economic theory is that it is desirable for firms in any given 
industry to compete with one another.  A world in which pure competition of this kind 
exists implies restrictions on the ways in which agents are allowed to interact.  In this 
paper, we contrast the properties of a general version of a model of species or agent 
interaction with that of a 'pure economic competition' version, which contains the 
required restrictions in the model. The model used is that of Solé and Manrubia [6], 
referred to subsequently as S-M, which has a particularly natural interpretation in an 
economic context.  (A similar approach, developed quite independently, is used to 
                                                 
1 A potential alternative approach to that of self-organised criticality to account for observed power law 
behaviour in the social sciences is given in [11] 
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describe the observed distribution of long-run growth rates across the Western capitalist 
economies [12]).   
 
We demonstrate that systems in which the restrictions on interactions between agents 
implied by economic theory do not in general give rise to power law behaviour in terms 
of the extinction patterns of agents.  Further, the overall level of industry fitness which 
emerges in a purely competitive model is low, implying that growth in such systems is 
not easy to achieve.  Co-operative (or collusive) interactions are required in order to 
generate power law behaviour of agent extinction, and such interactions lead to distinctly 
higher levels of industry fitness.  
 
The findings also have policy implications in terms of the regulation of industries.  
Collusion between firms, of whatever form, is held to reduce the overall level of social 
welfare (see almost any economics textbook e.g.[13]).   Most economic regulatory bodies 
are set up on exactly this principle: to promote competition between firms.  Yet this has 
an adverse impact on the overall fitness of the industry. 
 
Section 2 describes the S-M model, the economic interpretation of its principles, and how 
these are reflected in a pure economic competition version of the model.  Section 3 sets 
out the properties of the S-M model populated by limited numbers of agents such as are 
often found in individual industries at any point in time.  Section 4 contrasts these with 
the properties of the pure economic competition (PEC) version.  Section 5 provides a 
conclusion. 
 
2. The Solé - Manrubia model and its economic interpretation 
 
The model contains N species and a matrix of couplings, Jij, which indicates how each 
species i affects every other species j, with Jij  [-1, 1].  The model is solved over a 
sequence of iterated steps, and at each iteration the following occurs: i) for each species i, 
one of its Jij is replaced with a new value chosen at random from a uniform distribution 
on [-1, 1]  ii) the overall fitness of any given species is measured by fi = j Jij, and any 
 4
species for which fi < 0 is deemed to be extinct.  If m species become extinct, an 
avalanche of size m is deemed to have taken place  iii) an extinct species is replaced by a 
new entrant into the system, which is very similar to that of one of the surviving species.  
Specifically, a surviving species k is chosen at random to replace each extinct species j, 
and the linkages Jij and Jji are replaced with Jik +  and Jki + , where  is chosen at 
random from a small interval [-, + ]. 
 
The biological interpretation of the model is set out in [6, 10].  In an economic context, 
the Jij matrix can be thought of as the way in which the net impacts of their overall 
strategies lead individual agents, or firms, to interact in an economy or industry at any 
point in time.  Three combinations of pair-wise connections are possible in terms of the 
signs of the Jij : i) Jij, Jji > 0;  ii) Jij > 0, Jji < 0, or vice versa; and iii) Jij, Jji < 0    
 
Case (i) represents a situation in which firms benefit from each other's presence in a 
market.  This could arise by collusive behaviour when the firms deliberately decide not to 
compete.  The situation could also arise when, for example, two firms are independently 
opening up a new niche in a market.  Marketing activity such as advertising by each firm 
creates greater awareness of the new kind of product, from which the brands of both 
firms can benefit.    
 
Case (ii) arises when two firms are in competition, and the overall strategy of one firm is 
such that it gains fitness at the expense of its rival.  Case (iii) is a more intense example 
of the competitive case (ii).  In this instance, the degree of competition is such that the 
firms carry out actions which reduce both their fitness levels.  An example is when two 
firms become engaged in a price war which ultimately reduces both their profit levels 
(other illustrations of such behaviour are discussed in, for example, [14]).  Such a 
situation is unlikely to persist for any length of time, because it increases the chances of 
both firms becoming extinct. 
 
Economic theory recognises that under conditions of uncertainty it is impossible for 
individual agents to explicitly follow maximising behaviour with respect to their fitness, 
 5
because no one knows with certainty the outcome of a decision.  Maximisation 
nevertheless occurs, because competition dictates that the more efficient firm will survive 
and the inefficient ones perish (the classic statement of this is [15]). This can be 
expressed as the updating rule for the Jij in the model, in which each firm develops its 
strategy by a process of trial-and-error. 
 
The rule in the S-M model that extinct species are immediately replaced by new entrants 
implies that the economic interpretation has most relevance in industries in which new 
entry is relatively easy. This appears to be the case across a substantial part of the 
economy as a whole. For example, it is almost always the case in new industries [16].  
Even in the US car industry, in its early stages during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, no fewer than 1,641 producers participated at some time in the market 
[17].  Entry may be facilitated into more mature industries by regulatory change, (e.g. 
airlines and energy supply), by rapid technological innovation (e.g. the undermining of 
IBM by the development of the PC), or by a combination of both (e.g. 
telecommunications, financial services). 
 
3. Properties of the S-M model 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe briefly some key properties to enable 
comparisons with the pure economic competition version of the model to be made.  We 
discuss the relationship between the size of extinction events and their frequency, and the 
average fitness of the system. 
 
The size distribution of extinction events in the model is reported to follow a power law 
with exponent of around -2 [6], based upon versions of the model populated by 100 or 
150 agents.  The value of the exponent appears to depend upon the number of agents in 
the model, with results for 100, 200, 500 and 1000 agents shown in [10].  The 
dependence of the exponent on system size can be seen very clearly when smaller 
numbers of agents are used, which is probably more realistic in the context of single 
industry rather than in the general setting of biological species extinction.  For N =25, the 
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least squares fitted estimate of the exponent of a power law, averaged over 500 solutions 
of the model each solved over 50,000 iterations and the first 10,000 omitted to eliminate 
transient behaviour from initial conditions (as in [6]), is -3.36; for N =50 it is -2.92, and 
for N = 100 it is -2.43.  In each case, a power law does provide a reasonable description 
of the data.  The summary statistics for N = 100 are as follows: 
Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum 
  2.239  2.383 2.427  2.427 2.469 2.599 
 
The overall level of fitness of the system is of interest both in a biological and an 
economic context.  The maximum fitness which the model can take is theoretically N2.  
In practice, the system does not approach this level, but the average value of fitness over 
the iterations of each solution of the model is greater than zero (this average value varies 
very little between solutions of the model containing the same number of agents). 
 
The overall fitness of the system, as a proportion of the theoretical maximum for a given 
number of agents, rises slightly as the number of agents falls.  This is implied by 
analytical results on the probability of the sign of the connection between any two agents 
being positive or negative [18], and the prediction is confirmed empirically. The overall 
fitness of the system is averaged in each solution from iteration 10,001 to 50,000, and the 
mean of these values over 500 separate solutions is taken.  This figure is divided by the 
theoretical maximum for the number of agents, to give average fitness figures of 0.167 
for N = 25, 0.143 for N = 50, and  0.118 for N = 100. 
 
4. Properties of the Pure Economic Competition model 
 
The key feature of this model is that firms cannot benefit from each other's activities ( 
connections of the form Jij, Jji > 0 are excluded).  In a practical context, this could be 
brought about by regulation supported, if required, by legal sanctions.   
 
We report here the results of the PEC model when the interactions between pairs of 
agents are all of the form Jij > 0, Jji < 0 ( or vice versa ), which is the usual form of 
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competition between firms.  Allowing pair-wise connections of the form Jij, Jji < 0 leads 
to the properties of the model being even more different from those of the general 
version, with complete extinction of the entire set of agents being a not infrequent event. 
Clearly, if such an interaction holds for any length of time, the probability of both firms 
becoming extinct is high. 
 
Two versions of the PEC model are examined.  In version A, we retain the rules of the S-
M model for the initialisation of the J matrix and for the update rule for each agent at 
each iteration.  The replacement rule is as follows. When offspring species are being 
created, the replacement  Jij  are at first drawn in accordance with the normal Sole-
Manrubia rules.  They are then checked for their sign relationship. If  Jij > 0 and  Jji  > 0, 
then the sign of one of them switches sign with probability 1- P+ve  , where P+ve  is the 
probability that a positive-positive relationship will be allowed to be remain. Similarly, if 
Jij < 0 and  Jji  < 0, one of them switches sign with probability 1- P-ve  . The general Sole-
Manrubia model obtains when P+ve  = P-ve  =1.   In version A of the PEC model, we report 
results when P+ve  = P-ve  =0  i.e. the sign of offspring connections is changed at random2. 
 
In version B of the PEC model, both the initialisation of the J matrix and the update rule 
are subject to the condition that if the signs of Jij and Jji match, one of them is switched at 
random. The opposite-signs-only condition is maintained in the replacement rule by 
ensuring that the new  Jij  granted to new entrant preserve the signs of the Jkj on which the 
new entrant is based..  In the general model, the new Jij takes the value Jkj + , where k is 
the species chosen at random as the agent to be imitated and where  is a small random 
number drawn from [-, ].  In this version of the PEC model, if this leads to Jij being a 
different sign to Jkj, we assign the value Jkj -  to it instead. 
 
The first feature of the results to note is that in both versions of the PEC model, the 
power law relationship between the size and frequency of extinctions breaks down and no 
longer offers a description of the data.  There are far more very large extinctions in the 
                                                 
2 the unchanged update rule means that same-sign interactions between agents can exist, but in practice 
these make up less than 1 per cent of the total number of interactions 
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PEC system.  Figures 1a, b and c plot the relationships between extinction size and 
frequency in typical solutions of the model with N = 100 for, respectively, version A of 
the PEC model, version B of the PEC model , and the general version of the model.  
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Figures 1a to c.   Plots showing extinction size vs. frequency with logarithmic axes for 
typical solutions of (a: top left ) PEC model version A (b: top right) PEC model version 
B.  (c: bottom ) general S-M model. 
 
As a consequence of the high frequency with which large extinctions are observed, the 
average overall level of fitness of the system remains very low.  For example, with 100 
agents, the average level of fitness of the model over 500 simulations is only 0.0014 and 
0.056 in versions A and B of the PEC model, compared to 0.12 in the general version.  
Figure 2 shows the average level of fitness in the two versions of the PEC model and in 
the general model for N = 100 . 
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Figure 2. Bar chart showing the average total fitness (as a proportion of theoretical 
maximum fitness) for the three models. 
 
The overall level of fitness of the system is very low in version A of the PEC model. The 
higher level in version B is accounted for by the pattern of extinctions over time  Figures 
3a and b plot the numbers of agents becoming extinct in each period of a typical 
simulation of the general model and version B of the PEC model.  In model B, 
extinctions take place in bursts, with relatively long periods of very low extinction levels 
being interspersed by periods of very high levels.  The average overall fitness of the 
system over time is raised by the former.  
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Figures 3 a and b.  Typical extinction size patterns, plotted over 2000 mid-run iterations,  
for (top a) the S-M model and (bottom b) PEC model B, each with 100 agents. 
 
 
Overall, these results suggest that systems in which the only interactions of agents which 
are permitted are those implied by economic competition, do not generate the type of 
power law behaviour which is observed in actual economies. Further, a certain amount of 
collaboration and co-operation between firms in any given industry appears to be 
necessary for the industry as a whole to acquire viability in terms of overall fitness.  The 
enforcement of strict economic competition between firms by regulatory authorities, 
particularly in industries in which entry is relatively easy, runs the risk of causing large 
scale extinctions of companies. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Biological species interact with each other in ways which either increase or decrease the 
fitness levels of individual species. The outcome of interactions between firms in the 
economy on each others' fitness levels can be thought of in the same way, as the impact 
of the strategy of individual agents on other agents. Indeed, there is evidence of similarity 
of the empirical power law which relates the size of an extinction to its frequency in the 
extinction records of both biological species and firms in the economy.   
 
In economic theory, it is regarded as desirable that firms in the same industry should 
compete with each other, and should not enter into collusive or co-operative behaviour.   
This is the principle which underlies a great deal of the legal regulation of competition in 
industries which exists in the West. 
 
In this paper, we summarise the properties of a general model of agent interaction which 
has been used to account for the empirical relationships observed in the fossil record of 
the extinctions of biological species.  We contrast these with those of a pure economic 
competition version of the model, in which co-operative or collusive behaviour between 
agents is not permitted. 
 
The special case of the pure economic competition model has quite different properties 
from the general model of agent interaction.  A power law no longer gives a good 
account of the relationship between extinction size and frequency.  In other words, 
systems in which the only interactions permitted are those implied by economic 
competition, do not generate the type of power law behaviour which is observed in actual 
economies.  From a policy perspective, the overall level of fitness is much lower in the 
pure competition model.  This suggests that a certain amount of co-operation between 
firms is a necessary condition for the survival of an industry. 
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